Representational Faithfulness in Accounting: A Model of Hard Information
ABSTRACT: This study models representational faithfulness as "hard" information, or information that has a meaning upon which everyone agrees. In contrast to prior research, I show how "honest disagreements" may arise if we replace the assumption that individuals' information partitions are common knowledge with the weaker assumption that the language they use is common knowledge. I start from the usual approach where a person's knowledge is modeled as a partition of the set of states of the world. I show that a language is "soft" if and only if it is not isomorphic to a partition of the set of states of the world. This indicates that the standard approach to modeling knowledge may represent an incomplete characterization, since, in a world with soft information, a complete description of knowledge requires the specification of the message set as well as the information partitions of the relevant individuals. I also show how the hard/soft criterion is different from comparing information partitions on their fineness and from the concept of common knowledge. Next, using the probability distribution defined over the set of states of the world, I construct a measure of relative hardness. I show that harder information systems are more informative in terms of Blackwell's measure of relative informativeness. Also I show that relative hardness can be measured using the entropy of the underlying conditional probability distribution, providing a link between relative informativeness and the entropy measure.
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Representational Faithfulness in Accounting: Introduction
Consider the situation of an auditor who acts as an expert witness. The outcome of a court case often pivots on the testimony of an expert, so both sides to a dispute often bring their own experts. These experts auditors are sworn to tell the truth and are provided the same data; yet they often disagree. On the one hand, theoretically speaking, such "honest disagreements" seem surprising. While it may be possible that these experts disagree because they communicate strategically, economic theory has shown that the notion of an "honest disagreement" between experts is impossible.
2 On the other hand, practically speaking, such disagreements are expected and occasion no surprise when they occur. Further, the accounting profession has long recognized the possibility of honest disagreements. The conceptual framework in accounting recognizes that disagreement may exist about what financial information "purports to mean."
According to Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) #2 on the Qualitative
Characteristics of Accounting Information, the requirement that accounting information should represent what it purports to represent is referred to as "representational faithfulness." The objective of this paper is to develop a formal model of representational faithfulness.
The notion that perfectly observed information can have different meaning for different people has been defined in accounting theory as "soft" information. I use the term "hard" information to denote information that has the same meaning for all people, so that it possesses representational faithfulness, and the term "soft" information to denote information that is not hard. I show that the approach usually adopted in economic theory for expressing how economic players know things presupposes that all economic information is perfectly hard. In this manner, I show that honest disagreements do not arise when information is hard, but that they may arise 2 Strategic communication refers to possibly dishonest communication between individuals with conflicting objectives. The objective of this paper is to investigate the possibility of honest disagreements, so non-strategic communication is assumed. This objective is not trivial. For example, Aumann (1976) shows that if an event is common knowledge to experts with identical priors, then "agreeing to disagree" is impossible. The objective here is to see when, if ever, agreeing to disagree may indeed be possible.
when information is soft. I argue that the reason prior research finds that honest disagreements are impossible is that this research assumes that what each individual can know is common knowledge. 3 If we assume instead that the language individuals use, and not each individual's potential knowledge of the world, is common knowledge, then honest disagreements are possible. Further, I show that allowing information to lack representational faithfulness requires that the language used by decision-makers provide decision-useful information separate from the underlying facts that are being communicated. It is almost as if how we say something is as important as what we say. Also, I provide examples that demonstrate how both the notion of common knowledge and the fineness criterion used in past literature to compare information systems are distinct from the criterion developed to assess the hardness of an information system.
Last, I extend the model to develop a measure of relative hardness. I show how relative hardness is related to Blackwell's notion of decision-useful information and to the concept of entropy well established in information theory. 
Background and Prior Literature
The objective of this paper is to formally model and analyze the characteristic of representational faithfulness. Building this model led me to connect this research to other fundamental game theory research that effectively broadened the initial objective considerably.
To appropriately convey where this paper fits in the literature, it is necessary to clarify the narrowness of the original research objective, in particular, to show what the original work did not do, and then to show how the initial work led to a broader research agenda.
3 Sunder (2002) discusses the pivotal role that the common-knowledge assumption plays in accounting research. 4 Anctil, Dickhaut, Kanodia and Shapiro (2003) develop and test experimental a model of information transparency and coordination and what I refer to as Blackwell's notion of relative informativeness they refer to as the "Blackwell fineness" criterion. Their measure of transparency is close to my measure of hardness, but they do not explicitly identify or distinguish the set of purported meanings of reports.
In SFAC #2, FASB argued that "better" accounting information is that information which readers of accounting information find more useful in making their decisions. In assessing the decision-usefulness of accounting information, FASB identified two primary aspects of accounting information: its relevance and its reliability. I ignore relevance in this paper and focus instead on analyzing reliability.
SFAC #2 decomposes reliability into two components, representational faithfulness and verifiability, and states that a third component, neutrality, interacts with these two. FASB refers to the characterization that a reliable measure will represent "what it purports to represent" (par.59) as "representational faithfulness." SFAC #2 goes onto describe representational faithfulness as "the correspondence or agreement between a measure or description and the phenomenon it purports to represent" (par. 63). FASB describes verifiability as "the ability through consensus of measures to ensure that information represents what it purports to represent, … without bias or error" (glossary). While the conceptual framework describes intentional bias as a factor in the verifiability and neutrality of a measure, and pertains to representational quality, FASB distinguish representational quality from representational faithfulness. I also ignore representational quality and bias and focus only on analyzing the representational faithfulness of accounting information.
I purposely ignore reporting bias. People will likely communicate strategically, and prior literature has demonstrated that the strategic nature of the communication will significantly alter the game (see for example, Crawford and Sobel, 1982 , Gigler, 1984 and Fischer and Stocken 2001 . While my analysis can be extended to a strategic setting, intentional bias in reporting is not a factor in representational faithfulness. While analyzing reporting bias is extremely important, I believe that we need to model representational faithfulness separate from reporting bias if we are to understand how these aspects of information differ. I justify the narrowness of my definition of hard information because the focus of my research is not on representational quality (par 59) or on intentional bias in reporting, but on representational faithfulness. To address this research objective, I assume throughout this study that the decision-makers (abbreviated as DMs) communicate non-strategically.
Accounting research has directed attention at the notion of hard information since at least the early seventies when Ijiri (1975) emphasized this notion in arguing that accountability was a primary purpose of accounting measurement. 5 For Ijiri "the lack of room for disputes over a measure may be expressed as the hardness of a measure" (p. 36). He offers cash balances as an example of a hard measure and goodwill as an example of a soft measure. Gjesdal (1981) defines a soft information-reporting system as one in which the underlying information is unverifiable while the report is jointly observed and contractible. Penno (1990) , Penno and Watts (1991) and Arya, Fellingham and Glover (1995) have also addressed hardness of accounting information, where the unverifiability of the information drives the definition of softness. These papers do not all use the term "hard information" in the same way. However, all of these papers are capturing some aspect of the notion, stated by Ijiri, that a hard measure "is one constructed in such a way that it is difficult for people to disagree" (p. 36).
My approach differs from those discussed above in that they all focus on the fact that soft information is susceptible to manipulation; my approach focuses on the fact that soft information may be interpreted differently by different people without relying on differences in motivation.
As I discussed earlier, this is consistent with the research objective of modeling representational faithfulness, as opposed to modeling bias or representational quality. My approach also indicates that verifiability may be a more complicated notion than it at first appears. For example, my modeling of representational faithfulness shows that we may need to distinguish verifying facts by observing them from verifying what individuals know concerning these facts.
This issue with the meaning of "verifiability" relates directly to the work on common knowledge, especially Aumann (1976) . An event is called common knowledge to two players if player one knows it, player two knows player one knows it, player one knows player two knows player one knows it, etc. Aumann (1976) showed that if two experts have a prior probability on some event occurring, and these probabilities are common knowledge, then they must be equal.
My research objective is to consider how individuals interpret soft information. I show that experts may disagree about such information, which seems clearly to contradict Aumann's result. However, as Aumann points out, his result assumes that the information that each player can know (i.e., their information partitions) is common knowledge. I argue below that this assumption implicitly requires that information is hard, and therefore we need to relax it to allow for the possibility that information may lack representational faithfulness. This is where my initial narrow research topic broadened; this broadening requires elaboration.
Aumann (1976) defined common knowledge using an assumption commonly called the Common Prior Assumption, or CPA. 6 Loosely stated, the CPA says that differences in probability arise solely from differences in information; people who have the same information will assess any event as having the same probability of occurring. Aumann builds both his result in Aumann 1976 and the result (see Aumann 1987 ) that every Bayesian rational equilibrium is equivalent to a correlated equilibrium, upon the CPA. Challenging the CPA is not done lightly, nor was it the original objective of this research. However it appears unavoidable, so let's discuss the CPA in more detail.
As Aumann points (page 7, Aumann 1987) the CPA does not imply all players have the same subjective probability, but that all subjective probabilities differ only due to differences in information. He goes onto argue (ibid, pages 13-15) that the CPA is used because, unlike preferences, subjective probabilities are not individual, and also because the CPA enable researchers to "zero in on purely informational issues" in our models. Earlier (ibid page 9), Aumann argues that his assumption that the information partitions of the individual players is common knowledge is in fact a theorem or tautology, and not an assumption. Further, he argues that this is part of the model and that the "situation with priors is similar". Aumann (1998) expands upon these arguments in defense of the CPA in response to Gul (1998) , which argued that the CPA was an assumption, not a result, and that it could be relaxed. Morris (1995) provides perhaps the most thorough and eloquent discussion of the arguments for and against relaxing the CPA. He identifies 3 broad arguments for the CPA but concludes that the arguments either fail outright or hold limited sway, so that relaxing the CPA should produce useful research. Recent research (e.g., Morris, 1994 and Morris and Shin, 2002 and 2005 , and Halpern 2000 relaxes the CPA to good effect. 7 I do not argue why relaxing the CPA is valid; instead, I
argue below that relaxing the CPA is necessary for us to consider situations that lack representational faithfulness. In effect, assuming the CPA holds implies we assume representational faithfulness holds.
The research in this paper is also related to a line of behavioral accounting research that addresses the form managers use to present their information. This line of research has shown that the form of the information being communicated may affect how users of the information interpret it. The different types of communication that have been studied are quite varied, and include the form taken by earnings forecast (Hirst, Koonce and Miller, 1999) , environmental disclosures (Kennedy, Mitchell and Sefcik, 1998) and comprehensive income disclosures (Hirst and Hopkins, 1998) , among others. My finding that soft information involves a language that itself affects how DMs interpret the information is consistent with this research. Hence, the modeling of hard information in this paper complements this research, and in so doing, offers a 1 Halpern (2000) investigates two characterizations of the CPA, including one based on a logical language, and shows they differ over infinite spaces. Morris (1994) investigates how "no trade" theorems under heterogeneous beliefs, Morris and Shin (2002) look at the social value of public information under heterogeneous beliefs, and Morris and Shin (2005) construct a set of "interaction games" that generalize different types of heterogeneity.
way to connect this behavioral research to an analytical framework.
Other related research also stretches the range of possible decision-making criteria. In a closely related study, Stecher (2005) constructs an economy with subjective informational assumption and shows that the welfare theorems will not hold in this economy. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) offer a decision theory that is "Case Based," where the decision-maker uses a similarity function to organize his decisions prior to taking his actions. Hong and Page (2001) show that behavioral diversity can arise due to the type of game ensemble a player has historically played. The current paper brings the language that DMs use into the framework for describing how DMs know and how they communicate their knowledge, so complements these other studies as well.
Research Methodology and the Basic Model

An Example of the Hard/Soft Information Distinction
To convey what is meant by hard or soft information, consider an example of valuing a piece of equipment for financial statement purposes using historical cost or fair value accounting. For the purposes of this example, assume that fair value accounting requires the manager to identify a comparable asset and then report the fair market value of this comparable asset. Suppose a manager purchases the equipment for a cost $10 and estimates that the equipment has a life of two years and no salvage value. At the end of year one, the manager would report a historical cost for this asset of $5 under straight line depreciation, and any auditor would agree with this valuation. Next, suppose the manager reports $5 under fair value accounting as well. Because this is based on identifying a "comparable" asset, there is ambiguity in the report, even though the actual amount is the same as it is under historical cost. An auditor auditing the fair value amount would need to acquire estimates of the "comparable" asset, and then assess whether the $5 was a reasonable valuation for the equivalent asset. In fact, had the manager reported $6 or $4, it is often the case that the auditor would still have agreed with the valuation precisely because there is ambiguity in the application of the term " At first glance, one might think that fair value accounting merely adds noise to the report, but I believe the difference between historical cost and fair value accounting in the example is subtler. The difference actually relates to how the inference process of the auditor, or any financial statement reader, differs from that of the manager, or financial statement preparer. To see this, I first introduce the formal notation and the basic model. Then I reconsider the example of asset valuation to clarify the subtlety that I think actually exists.
3.2 Basic Model:
be a finite probability space and let S and G be partitions over the states of the world Ω presenting the information partitions of the manager and the auditor, respectively. 
x the anchor of message n m , or alternatively, I say that message n m is anchored at
The cardinality of the anchor set equals the cardinality of the message set, so that each message is anchored at one, and only one, anchor.
The anchor set specifies a set of states of the world about which the manager and auditor can agree when using message set M . The introduction of anchors accomplishes two tasks.
First, it ensures that the two players can communicate at some basic level. For example, when one player says "black" the second player knows that he does not mean "white." Second, in order to formally model representational faithfulness, I need to specify a set of states of the world that describe the phenomenon that the messages "purport to represent." The anchor set fills this role.
As stated earlier, I assume that the DMs communicate non-strategically. Specifically, I
assume both players can communicate, that is, can write and read the language, and do it honestly. The following assumptions on the signaling functions ensure that this is the case.
A2 (Signaling Functions Assumptions):
For any language form,
assume the following holds for the signaling function of the manager,
Analogous conditions hold for the signaling function,
, of the auditor.
Assuming the information partitions of each DM form the domain of their signaling function ensures that they can write in the message set. Condition i), the assumption that the functions are surjective, ensures the DMs can read in this message set while condition ii) ensures that they will not purposely report dishonestly. I use assumptions A1 on the anchor set and A2 on the signaling
functions to specify what is meant by a representationally faithful accounting method. I simplify the subsequent analysis by referring to a representationally faithful message as "hard," and a message that lacks representational faithfulness as a "soft" message.
Definition of the Hard/Soft Information Distinction:
To motivate the hard information definition, reconsider the example comparing two accounting methods for reporting asset value, historical cost and fair value accounting. We use language forms,
, to represent these methods, where the subscripts denote accounting under the historical cost and fair value methods, respectively. This means that
denote the report or message issued by the manager under historical cost and fair value accounting, respectively.
Denote the message mappings of the manager and auditor under historical cost accounting as 
As noted earlier, I rule out the possibility of strategic message choice via assumptions A1 and A2. This means that, by assumption, hardness is not a choice variable, but an exogenous characteristic of the language form. I will sometimes say a message set is hard, with the understanding that this means the language form is hard.
My definition of hard information coincides with the requirements for information to be hard laid out by Ijiri (1975) . Ijiri describes hard measurement as the "processing of verifiable facts by justifiable rules in a rigid system which allows only a unique set of rules for a given situation" (page 36). The rules are the signaling functions, which are unique for each DM. The fact is the state of the world that is observed by the DMs. My definition ensures that, under a hard language form, these facts can be communicated so that each DM "knows" the fact in the same way. However, under a soft language form, as I define it, the facts will not be "verifiable" in the usually sense of this word.
Within the context of my model, a DM can verify a "fact" or event by observing it.
Further, one DM can verify that a second DM "knows" this event by observing that the second DM observed the event. However, one DM may not be able to verify that the second DM "knows" the event in the same way as the first DM "knows" it. The DMs know the state of the world through the filter of their own information partition, but understanding what the other DM "knows" requires that this information be communicated and that the message be interpreted.
With soft information, DMs interpret this information differently. Different interpretations are possible because we no longer assume the DMs' information partitions are common knowledge. I return to this point when I relate hard information to the notion of common knowledge in Section 4.1 below.
While I define hardness in terms of the signaling functions, we can also speak about the inverse mappings, that is the mappings that take the reports into the information partitions.
Denote these inverse mappings as
and
for the manager and auditor respectively. I now introduce another definition that proves useful in subsequent analysis. This definition introduces message-equivalent signal spaces, which are the set of signals which can be communicated between DMs using a given message space. In this model, one DM's knowledge is knowable by another DM if and only if it can be communicated. Hence, these information partitions are the relevant ones for understanding the information that one DM knows that can be communicated using the given language. The importance of these sets is discussed in more detail below, especially in connection with Corollary 1, where I show that message-equivalent information partitions are identical if and only if the message space is hard.
Definition of Inverse Message
Results
The results are presented in two sections. In section 4.1, I start by presenting the basic representation result concerning hard message sets, and show how soft messages allow for disagreement. In section 4.2, I present definitions of relative hardness, and extend the analysis to show how the different measures of relative hardness can be used
Basic Results on Hardness
The first question that we wish to answer is whether the hardness of information is related to the message set used. In answering this question, direct message sets are important. A direct message set is defined as
to indicate that the set of states of the world is a refinement of the message set. The intuition is that hardness and directness are equivalent characteristics, and this intuition is formalized in the following theorem. 
where
(See Appendix for all proofs.) Theorem 1 states that an accounting method generates hard information if and only if the language is a direct representation of the states of the world. It is obvious that this condition suffices to ensure hardness, since we assume truth-telling by the DMs. The necessity of this condition is perhaps more surprising. It seems to be in the nature of virtually every language to include some messages that cannot be defined solely in terms of states of the world. For example, consider the formal definition of assets as "future benefits" While the term future benefits can be associated with certain states of the world, it seems impossible to construct an exhaustive list of states such that a future benefit exists if and only if one of these states occurs.
Theorem 1 tells that unless such a list can be constructed, the term future benefits lacks representational faithfulness.
Alternatively, Theorem 1 says that a necessary and sufficient condition for information to be soft is that the language form involves communicating using ambiguous messages in the sense that they have no specific meaning or definition in terms of the states of the world, but are nonetheless decision-relevant. 8 In fact, it is their ambiguity that enables these messages to convey meaning outside of the "knowledge" represented by the set of states of the world. Once we assume that the message set is a coarsening of the direct message set, the possibility that an intelligent and honest player may use his judgement in reporting a signal about the state of the world can be ruled out; he merely repeats the state itself. However, if in our language there is a word that is not definable in terms of specific states of the world and if this word is relevant to some decision, then that decision involves soft information.
Theorem 1 also highlights a relationship among the information partitions and the message space, which is formalized in the following corollary. 
is a (weak) coarsening of both S and G . Corollary 1 tells us that the opportunity to communicate knowledge as hard information is restricted to information that can be represented by an information partition that is a common coarsening of the information partitions of the DMs involved. Hence, the DMS may have information partitions that preclude the existence of any non-trivial accounting method that has representational faithfulness.
Two additional points follow almost immediately from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.
These points concern how the hard-soft distinction relates to the fineness criterion and to the notion of common knowledge of events. I discuss each of these in turn.
First based on a casual notion of hardness, one might think initially that hardness is equivalent to the notion of fineness: Corollary 1 shows otherwise. Simple examples demonstrate that having comparable information partitions, that is, being able to rank the original information partitions based on fineness, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the message set to be hard. First, if the message set is a singleton, so that the same message is always reported, then it is clearly hard. This holds even if partitions S and G are not comparable. The second point following from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 is that hardness is also independent of the notion of common knowledge. To see this, consider a situation, due to Aumann (1976) , where disagreement is impossible. Let ( ) p , Ω be a finite probability space and let S and G be partitions over the states of the world Ω presenting the information of two players. Let R be the meet or finest common coarsening of these two partitions, written in standard notation as , it is common knowledge at
This result says that if two experts have a prior probability on some event occurring, and these probabilities are common knowledge, then they must be equal. Theorem 1 seems clearly at odds with this result. We can trace the source of this conflict to what we assume to be common knowledge under each approach. Further, an event may be common knowledge for two players, yet they may disagree in their reporting of this event. Hence, the notion of whether or not the event is common knowledge is distinct from whether or not the report of this event is hard or soft. While the concept of common knowledge remains important, it seems that the latter criterion is the relevant one when investigating whether or not experts will agree on reported information.
The attractiveness of using information structures to describe the distinction between hard and soft information is its generality. However, this approach does not quantify hardness. In the next section, I address the latter difficulty at the cost of some generality.
Measures of Relative Hardness
This section provides a measure relative hardness. In my definition of relative hardness, I
use the probability distribution defined over the inverse image sets of the DMs. Defining hardness based solely on the underlying probability distribution allows a quantification of hardness. Prior to this point in the analysis, hardness has been defined only in terms of sets and functions and only in absolute terms. Showing an equivalent definition in terms of probabilities may convey more intuition about hardness, and it relates the hardness concept to a large body of literature. Further quantifying hardness allows us to speak of relatively harder or softer message sets, increasing the potential usefulness of the concept.
Use the conditional probabilities defined on the inverse messages sets of the two DMs, ) to define relative hardness as follows. , the following hold:
Definition of Relative
, with at least one inequality strict.
In general, the definition of relative hardness introduced above does not completely order a set of standards. We shall call two language forms compatible if they can be ranked using the above definition of relative hardness.
One can understand the intuition behind the definition most easily by recognizing that the definition of relative hardness is analogous to the notion of mean-preserving spreads. One distribution is a mean-preserving spread of a second distribution if the first distribution spreads the probability from realizations closer to the mean to realizations farther from the mean, while keeping the mean the same. In the above definition, the language forms differ only by the signaling function of the first DM. Instead of spreading the probability around the mean, softer information systems spread the probability of each conditional distribution of the first DM's signals around the second DM's signal.
Reconsider the example of valuing an asset used in Section 3 to motivate the definition of absolute hardness. Suppose for simplicity that the asset's value is either low or high, denoted as In general, a softer language form reduces the probability of a same message outcome,
, and raises the probability of a different message outcome. Hence, the perfectly hard message set has ( ) 1
As discussed below, it seems natural to define a message set of maximal softness as one that has I begin the analysis of the results of this section by showing that a harder language form is more informative in Blackwell's sense. This is done in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Suppose χ is relatively harder than ' χ as given in the definition above.
Then utility maximizing DMs prefer the relatively harder language form χ to ' χ .
Theorem 2 says that a harder message space produces signals that can be used by a DM to increase his expected utility. The intuition follows again by recalling the analogy of relative hardness to the notion of mean-preserving spreads. Just as mean-preserving spreads lower expected utility, so do softer message sets.
A valuable aspect of Theorem 2 is that it says a harder message set produces signals that are more informative, in the Blackwell sense, even though the information partitions of the two DM's may not be comparable. 9 Blackwell defined one signal as being more informative than a 9 Blackwell (1951) provided necessary and sufficient conditions under which ranking message sets by their informativenes is equivalent to ranking them by fineness. More specifically, Blackwell considered the case where there were two signals, S s ∈ and G g ∈ , and a decision-relevant variable X x ∈ , and a probability distribution p defined over these variables. He assumed that the signals were noiseless, so
held for all realizations of the variables. Blackwell showed that S was relatively more informative than G if and only if S was a refinement of second signal if the first signal enables the DM to obtain a higher expected utility. Theorem 2 may seem surprising, since Blackwell's famous result is often interpreted to mean that information systems can be ranked based on their informativeness only if the signals are comparable.
10 Theorem 2 demonstrates that this is not so if signals are noisy. Informally, a noisy signal is one that provides imperfect information about a decision-relevant variable (see note 7
for a formal definition of noiseless signals). For example, in the earlier discussion of valuing an asset, the decision-relevant information might be the cash flow that the asset will generate. The historical cost of the asset would be considered a noiseless signal if only one historical cost amount is possible for each actual cash flow realization.
In general, we expect most signals in accounting to be noisy signals, and not to provide perfect information. Theorem 2 states that compatible information systems, that is, those that can be ranked by relative hardness, can be ranked in terms of their informativeness even though they may include noisy signals. Hence it offers a way to partially order information partitions and message sets that is qualitatively different than the fineness criteria.
The second approach to measuring hardness uses the concept of entropy. 11 For any arbitrary probability distribution, ( ) , where the entropy is given by the following formula
For this second measure of relative hardness, I again use the conditional probabilities defined on the inverse message sets of the two DMs. Using these probabilities, let Marschak and Miyasawa (1968) , McGuire (1972) , Green and Stokey (1977) and Malueg (1985) clarify that assuming noiseless signals is an indispensable condition for refinement to be a necessary condition for relative informativeness. In my model, I relax the assumption that the signals are noiseless. 10 Demski (1973) applies Blackwell's theorem to accounting using this perspective. 11 As Khinchin (57) points out, the entropy concept first arose from the attempt to create a theoretical model for the transmission of information. denote the entropy of the conditional probability distribution ( )
and let
denote the expected value of the entropy of this conditional-probability distribution. Using these measures, we have the following result that describes relatively hard message sets in terms of the entropy of the conditional distributions.
Also, if χ is compatible with a second language form,
Theorem 3 provides a second and equivalent measure of relative hardness using the entropy of the conditional distributions over the inverse image sets. The previous analogy between mean preserving spreads and relative hardness again conveys the intuition of the result. The entropy of a distribution increases as we spread the probability among all the realizations, reaching a maximum when all realizations are equally likely. Under a softer language form, the probability of the conditional distribution is spread among the unanchored realizations. So, for example, given the auditor infers the inverse image message 
Theorems 2 and 3 together provide a link between Blackwell's measure of relative informativeness and the entropy measure; to my knowledge this is the first time such a link has been established. The key to establishing this link is, of course, the construction of the anchor set. The anchors formally establish a set of states of the world that represent what each message "purports to represent." By doing so, we are able to provide a non-trivial role for the accounting notion of representational faithfulness. The importance of building a formal model of representational faithfulness is underscored by Aumann's earlier result demonstrating conditions under which experts could not disagree. As the preceding results demonstrate, experts can disagree if the language they use is soft. Further, the relative level of disagreement can be rankordered. Hence, this model offers the potential for a comparative analysis of accounting standards based on their relative representational faithfulness.
Summary and Suggestions for Future Research
The objective of this paper was to develop a model of representational faithfulness by formally distinguishing between hard and soft information. The intuition for this distinction and the formal model were presented in Section 3 and I present the result of my analysis in Section 4.
Theorem 1 showed that a necessary and sufficient condition for information to be soft was that the information be communicated using a nonsensical symbol. By nonsensical I mean a symbol that cannot be defined in terms of the states of the world, but which was nonetheless relevant to the decision-maker. I also showed that the comparability of the information partitions was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the message space to be hard. Further I showed that whether or not an event is common knowledge does not dictate whether that event could be represented by a hard message.
I also investigated the relationship between hard information as defined on information partitions and the underlying probability distribution, and defined a measure of relative hardness.
Theorem 2 showed that a harder language form would generate a more informative signal, using Blackwell's notion of relative informativeness. Theorem 3 showed not only that the entropy of the conditional probability distribution offered an equivalent definition of hard information, but also that entropy could be used to rank order the language forms in terms of their relative hardness. Hence, entropy quantified hardness, and provides a quantification of relative informativeness in Blackwell's sense. Although no specific applications of the hard/soft distinction in information have been formally developed, numerous research questions might benefit from the concept of soft information. I describe a few in more detail.
In SFAC #2, FASB offer the use of fair value or replacement cost for valuing assets as an explicit example of the difficulties faced when accountants attempt to achieve representational faithfulness. However, this is just one example where the representational faithfulness of an accounting construct may be questioned. The procedures for estimating most reserves, such as a reserve on uncollectible receivables, inventory obsolescence, warranties and sales returns, or a reserve for litigation may all be described as examples that require accountants to clarify the representational faithfulness of the accounting information reported. Also the efficacy of standards, both auditing and accounting, might be analyzed using this distinction. In particular, modeling hard information as representational faithfulness may be a first step in constructing an analytical framework that corresponds to the conceptual framework of financial reporting provided in the Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts.
Second, the effect of the hard/soft information distinction on the role of public accountants is particularly interesting. Often research portrays the role of public auditors as verifying unobservable signals and then focuses on possible collusion between the manager and the auditor against the investor, resulting in misrepresentations to the investor. While blatant collusion such as fraud clearly exists, most such collusion seems subtler, and more difficult to analyze within the current auditing models. For example, current approaches do not model well the possibility of honest disagreements between knowledgeable parties, on which most lawsuits rest. The hard/soft distinction in information offers an approach to formalize the demand for expert opinions (including lawyers and economists as well as auditors). It also offers a way to explicitly model judgement or subjective evaluation of information that must be a part of any complete model of auditing. Auditing expertise may be related to soft information. An auditor does more than verify the accuracy of numbers in the financial statements; she also judges whether or not they are accumulated in accordance with GAAP on a consistent basis. If all people interpret information in the same way, then no judgement is required of the auditor: only with soft information does the auditor's judgement and expertise play a role.
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Third, in the standard principal-agent model, the incentive problem arises solely because the agent's effort is unobservable by the principal. An equally valid description of the problem might be that the agent's effort is soft information. Thus even if the agent was honest, difficulty in contracting may arise. Further, these two different problems may arise simultaneously. The contract that solves the incentive problem when the action is unobservable may (or may not) be the same as the optimal contract when the outcome of the action is soft information.
The three areas discussed above are only a few of the areas to which the hard/soft information distinction might be applied. Other areas include work on incomplete contracting, valuation, bounded rationality, common knowledge, and the mechanism design literature's analysis of the information requirements for implementation of an equilibrium, to name a few.
For example, the hard/soft distinction can be easily extended to the framework of a Bayesian communication game, which has been applied to the principal-agent model (Myerson, (1982) ) as well as to the mechanism-design literature (Reiter and Reichelstein, (1988) ). Among other results, it is straightforward to show that the revelation principle will fail if information is soft, but holds for hard information. Thus the approach appears very flexible.
12 See Caplan and Kirschenheiter (2004) for an application of the hardness criteria to auditing expertise. Clearly
is also hard, completing the proof of theorem 1.
Proof of Corollary 1:
The proof follows immediately from Theorem 1 once we note that the messages set defined in Theorem 1 insures that
Proof of Theorem 2:
The proof utilizes a lemma that is first introduced and proved. show that all the elements are positive but less than 1, and this completes the proof.
To simplify the notation, without loss of generalization, let P and ' P denote the matrices of conditional distributions, where P is harder than ' P . As is usual, denote the n th row and m th column of the P matrix as nm p , and similarly for the ' P matrix, so that, As is standard, the row element indicates the conditioning variable and the column element indicates the realization of the random variable, so for example,
This means that for each row in P and ' P , the sum of the row elements equals one. If B exists, we have
To show B is markov, we need to show that such a B exists where each element is non-negative and the rows sum to one, or more specifically, where the following two conditions hold, App.i) 
There are N such equalities, with 
This produces the following system of N equations. 
Since the elements of the P and ' P matrices are given, this is a system of N equations in the [ are non-zero, and then start with the equations having a zero coefficient on the 11 b variable (we assumed only A.N meets this condition). The process is given in several steps below.
Step 1: In this step, I add multiples of the different equations to insure that the probabilities in each column are positive above some specified row, and all the diagonal values equal 1. At the end of this step, I will have created a new probability matrix, * P , with the following form: Step 4, or until a non-minimal coefficient is found, in which case, proceed to Step 3.
Step 3 minimal, and then repeat step 2 for A.n.
Step 4 are the first row matrices in the matrices P and ' P , respectively. Also, from above we have that First, entropy is non-negative. Second, for two independent probability distributions 1 A and 2 A , (see Khinchin (1957) 
